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 Farmers’ Rights in India: "Globally Sui Generis"1 
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rajshreechandra@yahoo.in 
"Globally sui generis" is undoubtedly an oxymoron. The term sui gene-
ris is a Latin phrase, meaning "of its own kind or genus" and hence 
"unique in its characteristics." It exists in a contradistinction with any 
principle or regime that is universalised or globalised, in short, with 
anything that infringes or threatens to subsume its own particularity. It 
is the subversion of this particularity that the heading alludes to in the 
conceptualisation of farmers’ rights in general and in the Indian Pro-
tection of Plant Variety and Farmers’ Rights (PPV&FR), 2001 legislation 
in particular.  
Farmers’ rights talk began in the mid-1980s within a certain global-
law format and this ensured that multiple sui generis histories under-
went a discursive delimitation at its inaugural moment. While rhetoric, 
talk, pronouncements, and the "objectives" section of international 
treaties and conventions invoked plurality, stewardship and indige-
neity, the legality of farmers’ rights was clearly articulated within the 
discursive frames of innovation. This paper takes the farmers’ rights 
legislation in India—the PPV&FR Act, 2001—in order to demonstrate 
how the rhetoric of legal pluralism has tended to obscure the deep 
connection farmers’ rights have retained with international legal regi-
mes and narratives of innovation. 
The aim of this paper is to draw attention to the deep interconnec-
tions of sui generis farmers’ rights with global regimes of intellectual 
property that are retained. As a result, it ends up simultaneously 
addressing farmers and breeders, stewards and innovators, customary 
rights and Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). The paper will argue that 
the ambivalence of its address restricts the authority of stewardship 
and customary claims of local farming communities in general. Making 
room for these double inclusions within the framework of law has 
   
 


























meant that a series of conflictual interplays get inscribed in the content 
of entitlements that are legalised in instruments such as the PPV&FR 
Act. Conflicts between the farmer and the breeder, between innovation 
and stewardship, between nature and culture are shown to be resolved 
through a doubly inscribed farmers’ entitlement that faces two ways, 
i.e. both towards a cultural-local and the scientific-universal. On the 
one hand farmers’ rights hold out the promise of legal entitling far-
mers’ innovation claims and intellectual property, on the other they 
disable the more conventional, determinate property rights that far-
mers have in seeds, crops, grain, plants and land. I will discuss the 
proposition that the diminished terrain of conventional property rights 
is an outcome of the discursive location of farmers’ rights within the 
merged protocols of property and innovation.  
Farmers’ Rights: Rhetoric and Conceptions 
Farmers’ Rights have an odd genealogy, both in India and globally. 
Historically, there was nothing like a 'legal' conception of a farmers’ 
right, despite customary rights of the farmers being as old as history. 
A legalised conception of farmers’ rights began to be framed in the 
context of, and within the assemblage of intellectual property rights in 
plant genetic resources. It began to be argued that the two concerned 
international agreements—the Union for Protection of Plant Varieties 
agreement (UPOV—1961, 1978, 1991)2, and the Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights agreement (TRIPS—1995)3—
both set up to give crop plant breeders exclusive rights over the 
varieties they develop, disregard customary rights of indigenous and 
farming communities to their genetic resources and associated 
knowledges. UPOV and TRIPS, it was argued, substantially broadened 
the gap between source materials and improved varieties in terms of 
value and ownership rights attached to them. 
These agreements left the farmers, the traditional breeders and 
conservers, outside the domain of intellectual property rights in agro 
bio-resources and associated knowledge. It was this omission that 
spawned the debate and the movement for a formal recognition and 
institutionalisation of farmers’ rights. Regine Anderson in her work on 
the history of farmers’ rights, records that the idea of farmers’ rights 
came up in the early 1990s "as a countermove to the increased 
demand for plant breeders’ rights" (Anderson 2005: V). Voiced in 
international negotiations, its purpose was to draw attention to the 
unremunerated innovations of farmers that were seen as the found-
   
 


























ation of all modern plant breeding (ibid.). 
There are persuasive arguments in favour of farmers’ rights that are 
articulated at various levels. The starting point of the core argument is 
that biotechnology led innovations in plant varieties and animals did 
not happen spontaneously. It used as a base the knowledge of seeds 
and breeds and plant properties, generated, shared and exchanged 
over thousands of years. Farmers, in most developing countries, have 
been the main actors involved in saving, selecting and breeding seeds 
to produce new varieties with better suited traits, biodiversity manage-
ment and so on. They have played the combined roles of producer, 
consumer and conserver. They are thus the original rights holders of 
agricultural resources.  
The emerging rhetoric of farmers’ rights was an acknowledgement 
that while commercial breeders were protected by either plant bree-
ders’ rights or through patents in plant varieties, farmers’ contributions 
as preservers and developers of the gene pool remained unrewarded 
and unprotected.4 There was also a growing understanding that paten-
ting will seriously limit the access that farmers, the poor in particular, 
have to the genetic resources on which their livelihoods depend. The 
rhetoric acknowledged that livelihood rights of the farmers needed to 
be protected—particularly in developing countries which are predomi-
nated by small and marginal farmers—by securing their access to the 
genetic resources under threat by patents and plant breeder rights.  
The conception of farmers’ rights has added a new dimension to the 
existing discourse on rights. There was an acknowledgement that far-
mers deserved and needed protection, as a matter of 'right'. The con-
ception of farmers’ rights was articulated differently at different 
forums. On the one hand, movements and organisations like Via 
Campesina5, and GRAIN6, saw farmers’ claims as foundational claims 
of liberty and security and prior to rights of breeders. On the other 
hand, organisations like FAO (United Nation’s Food and Agriculture 
Organisation) recognised farmers’ claims as stewards of crop and plant 
genetic resources, but underscored the need to harmonise farmers’ 
rights with breeders’ rights. 
A FAO report on India had advised India to formulate plant breeders’ 
rights in accordance with UPOV while 'also' recognizing farmers’ rights 
(FAO, 1993). A website hosted by the International Treaty for Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA)7—one of the 
main FAO instruments for the protection of farmers’ rights at the inter-
national level—rather candidly spells out the parametric conditions for 
   
 


























the implementation of farmers’ rights and admits that any conception 
of farmers’ rights will ultimately need to be synced with international 
imperatives.  
The extent to which Farmers’ Rights can be implemented in a 
country is not only dependent on the needs and priorities within 
the country. Often it is also subject to the obligations that the 
country has towards various international and regional agree-
ments. Thus, harmonization of Farmers' Rights is not only impor-
tant at the national, but also at the international level.8 
(Emphasis added) 
Agenda 21 of the UN Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED) also reflected these concerns.9 The International Treaty for 
Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA) 2001, 
which emerged from the resultant negotiations, mandated national so-
vereignty over plant genetic resources, a mandate that served to make 
the commons a national heritage rather than a common heritage of 
mankind.10 
The climate was thus set for the institutionalisation of India’s sui 
generis legislation. The PPV&FR Act adopted a model of "co-equal" 
rights in which both breeders and farmers were treated at par and 
considered to be valid claimants of protection of the varieties they 
innovated. In many ways the Indian law went beyond the construction 
of farmers’ rights in international conventions and treaties like the 
ITPGRFA and the Convention of Biological Diversity (CBD), 1991.11 It 
treated farmers not just as stewards of biotic reserves and resources 
who were entitled to benefits, but also as innovators of plant varieties 
and creators of intellectual property. As Rangnekar points out, India 
"exercised legal imagination and shrewdly forum-shopped to introduce 
countervailing norms and principle."12 India chose to combine TRIPS 
style patent protection, UPOV style breeders’ rights and some measu-
res of farmers’ protection.13 It adopted a sui generis model, which 
grants farmers rights but found no contradiction with the prospect of 
queuing up for UPOV membership that, as an inter-governmental orga-
nisation, privileges and pushes for the protection of (technological) 
breeders and their intellectual property claims.14  
In order to create spaces for the rights of local farming communities 
and indigenous peoples to control and access their agro-genetic 
resources, it was argued that an alternative sui generis conception of 
rights, creatively based upon the historical ways and systems of local 
communities, needs to be devised and incorporated in the legal frame-
   
 


























works and instruments governing international exchange of biogenetic 
resources. The use of the terminology sui generis is significant: it en-
compasses a large array of different, locally peculiar and meaningful 
organisational and cultural realities. Conceptually, it allows for a reflec-
tion on plural and perhaps collective attitudes towards the ownership, 
use, custodianship, stewardship, sharing, and enjoyment of resources. 
In various countries including India, it enabled national states to use 
TRIPS exception under Article 27.3 (b) and adopt sui generis provi-
sions that protected farmers’ claims, even as it mandated protection 
for breeders. It further enabled countries like India to fill out the legal 
meaning of farmers’ rights in terms of a content that was wide-ranging 
and expansive. The Plant Variety Protection and Farmers Rights 
(PPV&FR) Act, 2001, is a good example of sui generis legislation that 
accorded the Indian farmer entitlements that were encompassing and 
a space that was co-equal with that of the breeder. One could allege 
that it was a concept that had searched and found its content.  
This paper, however, seeks to take the question of content or the 
legal form, a step further. Content, in many ways, is the speech of law 
that authorises the bearer of the right and spells out the terms of what 
law authorises. However, an exclusive focus on the capacious content 
of farmers’ rights can serve to divert attention from how access to the 
content is disabled at various levels in the practical play of this right. 
While rights are instruments that provide access to resources and 
liberties, access to a right is a matter that is relatively under-reflected. 
What kind of access law provides is an important question, but an 
equally important question is, what kind of access is there to law in 
general? I want to supplement the focus on the content of rights with 
questions of access and then relate it to a deeper understanding of law 
that reveals the embedded discursive strains of innovation in the arti-
culation of farmers’ rights.  
Farmers’ Rights in India: The Background 
It is important to place farmers’ rights in the larger context of policy 
shifts during the late 1980s and the 1990s. There are well-documented 
studies that confirm that till the late 1980s, plant breeding in India was 
largely the preserve of the public sector (Chandrashekaran & Vasudev 
2002; Chaturvedi 2002; Kochupillai 2011; Manjunatha 2013; Rao 
2004; Seshia 2002). It was driven by a widely shared perception that 
construed proprietary rights over plant genetic resources as inimical to 
the dispersion of common pool resources like seeds. However, from 
   
 


























the late 1980s, a discernible shift in perception, fuelled by policy shifts 
towards liberalisation of economy privatisation of resources and, began 
to be marked. In keeping with these larger trends, the idea that priva-
tisation of the seed sector and plant breeders’ rights would facilitate 
entry of improved breeding technology began to circulate in various 
policy circles and soon began to influence institutional reasoning and 
design. These trends also corresponded with global trends that saw a 
correspondence between capital accumulation and plant variety pro-
tection, more specifically between progressive commodification of the 
seed and privatisation of plant genetic resources (Fowler 1994; 
Goodman & Redclift 1991; Goodman et al. 1987; Kloppenburg 1988). 
The TRIPS and the UPOV, in 1995 and 1991, in many ways set the glo-
bal template for the codification of rules and norms that were to 
govern trade and innovation of plant genetic resources. India was 
simply enacting the same developmental story. 
The Indian route to "alignment", with international plant variety pro-
tection regimes, however, was not a straightforward story of mimi-
cking the patent regime of TRIPS or the breeders’ rights regime of the 
UPOV. Breeders’ rights in India were mostly an outcome of the globali-
sing tendency of capital and the mandated integration of national poli-
cies with international trade law. But the Indian plant-variety-protec-
tion story acquired a certain particularity. The plant variety protection 
talk was peppered with some concern and advocacy for farmers, parti-
cularly the small and marginal farmers. One of the primary drivers of 
this talk was contestation within certain spaces of the civil society that 
resisted an un-moderated alignment with the global plant variety pro-
tection regimes. While the impulses of international trade and innova-
tion discourse were propelling Indian responses towards a more glo-
balised regime of plant variety protecttion, farmers’ campaigns and 
movements made farmers a distinct political constituency that deman-
ded legal and political accommodation. 
The threat of privatisation and globalisation of the seed market 
mandated by TRIPS compliance, triggered widespread protests by far-
mers’ lobbies, environmentalists and civil society networks. In 1993, 
half a million farmers participated in a historic Bija Satyagraha—a 
Gandhian mode of protest for seed sovereignty—rally at Bangalore’s 
Cuban’s Park. Navdanya—an organisation set up by environmentalist, 
Vandana Shiva—was at the forefront of the "Bija Satyagraha" move-
ment, "to keep seed in farmer’s hand and to not cooperate with IPR 
laws that make seed a corporate monopoly, and make seed saving and 
   
 


























seed sharing a crime."15 This was the first internationalised protest 
against the WTO. 
The Karnataka Rajya Raitha Sangha (KRRS—Karnataka State Far-
mers Organizations), described by Via Campesina as a "key actor in 
the global peasant revolt", represented another face of the protests 
and dissent prevailing in India.16 As part of Bija Satyagraha move-
ment, KRRS used peasant seeds as a symbol of peasant resistance 
against seeds patented by corporations like Cargill. In 1998, opposition 
was launched against Monsanto and the "Monsanto Quit India" cam-
paign was launched by various farmers’ organisations and NGOs inclu-
ding Navdanya and the KRRS17 (Shiva 1999). There was a call by 
KRRS for direct action by farmers against biotechnology. Operation 
"Cremation Monsanto" was launched; it termed agro-giants like Mon-
santo, Novartis, Pioneer etc. "corporate killers" and demanded their 
ouster from the country.18 
It was in this climate of dissent, protests, and apprehensions in poli-
cy circles that breeders’ rights were introduced in India in 2001. Jost-
ling for political space and legal endorsements, the policy instrument 
was prized open to make room for farmers’ rights. The oppositional 
public attitudes towards globalisation in general and seed monopolies 
in particular, to a large extent, were responsible for induction of far-
mers’ rights in the frames of plant variety protection.   
When the PPV&FR bill was introduced in the Indian Parliament in 
December 1999 (Brahmi, Saxena & Dhillon 2004), the primary inten-
tion was to start parliamentary process before India, as a WTO sig-
natory, would become fully TRIPS compliant by 1 January 2005. This 
draft was largely a plant breeder’s rights legislation before it was 
referred to a Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC). Notable in the 
negotiations process (which carried on for almost a decade, from 1993 
onwards) was the absence of participation or representation by far-
mers.19 The initial version of the bill introduced in the Parliament con-
tained only a short provision on farmers’ rights. The Bija Satyagraha 
movement and the anti-corporation sentiment may have well been 
instrumental in shifting the terms of farmers’ entitlements. The JPC 
added a whole new chapter on farmers’ rights, putting a stamp of 
legislative authority on farmers’ claims.20 Thus came into being a uni-
que provision that not only provided plant variety protection to bree-
ders but also granted rights to farmers over their plant varieties. It 
was a tacit acknowledgement of the fact that farmers are as much hol-
   
 


























ders of intellectual property as the modern biotechnologically assisted 
plant breeders are.  
The Protection of Plant Variety and Farmers Rights Act 
The PPV&FR Act begins by stating its twin purposes:  
(i) To establish an effective system of plant variety protection in 
order to encourage the development of new varieties of plants; 
(ii) To protect the rights of the farmers in respect of their contri-
bution in conserving, improving and stewarding bio-genetic re-
sources and making available plant genetic resources for the 
development of new plant varieties.21  
The conjoining of the two rights—farmers’ and breeders’—was largely 
governed by two overlapping narratives. It was firstly based on norma-
tive considerations that often drive group and collective entitlements—
a recognition that farmers’ customary ways of farming, managing and 
securing agricultural resources and biodiversity ought to be supported 
and rewarded because it is critical for protecting livelihoods and food 
security of the millions who are dependent on agriculture. The second 
strand of thinking was motivated by developmental concerns. A focus 
on ensuring access to technology and modernising and liberalising 
seed production would promote the overall development of the agricul-
tural sector. 
Keeping both these objectives in mind, India institutionalised pro-
prietary claims in plant varieties to protect the rights of innovators, but 
balanced it with farmers’ rights. Dual protection, it was argued, would 
be likely to facilitate the growth of seed industry, ensure the availabi-
lity of high quality seeds and planting material to the farmers, as well 
as protect the farmer from the vagaries of the market. The law thus 
emerged from a process that attempted to incorporate the interests of 
various stakeholders: farmers, private sector breeders, public sector 
institutions, researchers, non-governmental organisations and inter-
governmental organisations, thus creating a deeply imbricated, dense 
terrain of entitlements (the implications of which I discuss shortly).  
Accommodating these twin purposes meant granting recognition of 
the proprietary claims of both the famers and breeders, more accura-
tely, of farmers as breeders. The Act explicitly endorsed the status of 
the farmer as a breeder when it states in Section 2 (c): "'breeder’ 
means a person or group of persons or a farmer or group of farmers or 
   
 


























any institution which has bred, evolved or developed any variety […]." 
The Act affirmed that farmers—who have selected plants of utility from 
wilderness, domesticated them by mastering their means of per-
petuation, have further modified the traits making farm produce more 
storable and palatable, who have undertaken crop improvement acti-
vities (Nagaraj & Yadav 2008)—have a claim to be counted as bree-
ders. The affirmation of farmers’ authorial status within the PPV&FR 
Act devolves into the following sets of entitlements for the farmers.  
Authorial Claims:22 
(i) Right to save, use, exchange, share and sell farm produce 
of a protected variety, except sale of branded variety.23 
(ii) Right to register their varieties and to authorize and regu-
late the use of such varieties.24 
(iii) Right to claims of benefit sharing if their registered varie-
ties and land races have been used for deriving new varieties.25 
Privileges and Immunities: 
(i) Farmers are to be compensated for low or failed perform-
ance of propagating material if the performance is below what 
has been claimed by the breeder.26 
(ii) In recognition of the role of traditional and rural commu-
nities in conserving and preserving genetic resources of land 
races and wild relatives of crops, farmers are entitled to recog-
nition and reward for the contribution made by them in the evolu-
tion of a variety, from the National Gene Fund.27  
(iii) Farmers are to be protected from penal action for acts of 
innocent infringement. 
We see two kinds of endorsements here: First, proprietorial claims of 
farmers as authors of plant varieties; and second, collective, genera-
tional rights of the farming community. While authorial claims of the 
farmers are clearly located within the narrative of ownership and 
"claims", collective stewardship claims are articulated in the vocabulary 
of privileges and immunities. The authorial claims are what Hohfeld 
(1917) calls, "first order" rights, meaning rights that are primary 
claims of a farmer.  
Privileges and immunities—protections, rewards, compensation, and 
assistance—are "second order" rights. These are important but they do 
not form the central or the enabling feature of a farmer’s proprietorial 
   
 


























claims. In "Time to Share Benefits", Kochupillai (2012) draws attention 
to how the Indian government-funded agricultural institutes and orga-
nisations, draw upon farmers’ varieties but register the plant variety as 
a "new variety" rather than as a "derived variety" which would have 
obligated them to share benefits. In another instance, Monsanto had 
entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the Andhra Pradesh 
State Government to pay for compensation in case of Bt cotton crop 
failure due to seed quality. It did not pay up despite successive crop 
failure between 2004 and 2006.28 
A further point that needs to be underscored is that rewards, com-
pensation and benefits are in the form of an "objectively determined 
value" or a compensation for the destruction or encroachment of an 
initial entitlement (Calbresi & Melamed 1972). In other words these 
"protections" are in the form of liability rules that signify a scheme of 
allowable transfers by entities like courts, government agencies, policy 
makers etc. The price at which these transfers take place will always 
be contingent on exigencies that include the market but do not exclu-
sively confine themselves to it. In quite a few cases, especially emi-
nent domain acquisitions, the farmer and his valuations may be totally 
excluded.  
A primary reason why strong proprietorial claims are indispensable 
for the farmers is because they entail strong duty correlates. A far-
mer’s proprietary claim on her seeds entails a duty on a corporate 
breeder, for example, to 'not' freely access or pirate these seeds with-
out consent or sharing of benefits. Legally, it gives the farmer a right 
to exclude other claims on her property. Further, it enables the farmer 
to attach a subjective value to her property and demand a price that 
she feels she deserves; anything less and the owner can decline the 
compensation offered. The owner, in other words, can exercise a 
transactional veto over what is her property. This is the exclusion stick 
of the bundle of a property right. And this is a much stronger articula-
tion of rights than privileges of reward or liability claims of compen-
sation (Chandra 2016: 99-102). 
It is to the PPV&FR Act’s credit that it takes the narrative of farmers’ 
entitlements beyond the discriminatory, "liability" conceptions of bene-
fits, privileges and compensation. The Act grants to farmers authorial 
status that gives them the right to commercialise their knowledge 
rather than simply stop others from commercialising it. The PPV&FR 
Act is a definite advance over the UPOV formulation of farmer’s "privy-
lege", and within it of the progressive delimitation of a farmer’s 
   
 


























privilege to save and exchange seeds. By replacing vocabulary of "pri-
vilege" with "rights" PPV&FR makes an important political move, confir-
ming the local practices and cultures of agriculture. And then by inclu-
ding, within the scope of farmers’ rights, a farmer’s right to save, 
exchange, re-sow and sell (under stipulated conditions), it affirms the 
plural economic spaces of commodity exchange too. 
Thus, the farmer in India, unlike his counterparts in the US or Cana-
da29, retains his property right not just over the grain, but also over 
the seed as a factor of production. S/he can re-sow the protected vari-
ety of seed without being subjected to "technology agreements"30 and 
s/he can even "brown bag"31 protected seeds and sell them. Prima 
facie, a farmer’s conventional right over seeds appears secured by the 
Act. But a deeper investigation reveals another aspect of the property 
story. 
Claiming Property 
By and large, farmer’s right is posited as a new type of right within, as 
Borowiak suggests, "the discourse on property" (2004: 528). It pre-
tends to be cast in a different language; in as much it locates itself in 
diffuse communities’ shared knowledge and traditional practices, the 
contributions of past generations and so on. But the overall strategy is 
located in the "equal respect principle" which grants a farmer rights 
over his varieties much in the same way as breeders get over their 
varieties. It is this ethical imperative of "equality" that disables the 
varied entitlements that accrue to the farmer under the PPV&FR Act. 
While this form of right has created a strategic site for symbolic as 
well as material recognition for farmers, in practice rights in the IPR 
framework only acquire their material valence when generated at the 
nexus of property and technological innovation. In other words, pro-
perty, in the absence of a technological genealogy, fails to become a 
sufficient condition for underwriting farmers’ prospects of agency and 
empowerment. Further, perhaps an unintended consequence of the 
alignment of property with innovation protocols is also the disabling of 
more "conventional" property claims.  
Promotion of ownership—the farmer’s right to save, use and sell 
seeds—hides other discreet processes that encroach upon farmers’ 
rights. For example, the right to sell applies typically to open-polli-
nated and inbred plant varieties—the kinds developed by farmers—the 
seeds of which can be replanted over and over again, saved and then 
either sold or exchanged. However, hybrid seeds, that are artificially 
   
 


























cross-pollinated, and bred to favour desirable characteristics, like 
higher yield, more uniform size etc., are programmed in such a way 
that seeds produced from hybrid plants lose their "hybrid vigour" due 
to the feature of segregation. Kochupillai states that hybrids have 100 
percent seed replacement rate, meaning that in order to maintain the 
quality and quantity of produce, seeds have to be purchased afresh 
from the market every season (Kochupillai 2011: 93). As a result, new 
seeds must be purchased every planting season. Needless to add, the-
se seeds are not the ones to which the "right to save, exchange and 
sell" applies.  
According to estimates, the hybrid seed market has grown at a stu-
pendous Compounded Annual Growth Rate of 36.1 percent over the 
period 2007-13. Almost correspondingly, the contribution of varietal 
seeds to the overall commercial seed market in India has witnessed a 
steep decline from 72 per cent to 36.8 percent in the fiscal year 2013 
in the same period (Ken Research, 2013). In 2013 non-vegetable 
seeds accounted for 82.2 per cent of the overall seed market in India, 
cotton contributing the largest share of 40.8 per cent. Reflecting on 
the period between 2002 and 2011, Dravid (as cited in Mnajunatha et 
al. 2013: 4) states that the major growth drivers of seed industry in 
India are single cross maize hybrids, Bt cotton hybrids, hybrid pearl 
millet, hybrid rice and hybrid vegetables developed by the private 
sector. According to estimates, the share of research hybrids on total 
turnover of crops like sorghum, pearl millet, sunflower, maize cotton, 
shorghum-sudan grass, has risen dramatically. 
According to the eleventh annual Indian Biotech Industry survey by 
Biospectrum-ABLE (Association of Biotechnology-Led Enterprises), the 
Indian biotech industry grew by 15.1 percent in 2012–13, increasing 
its revenues from Rs 204.4 billion to Rs 235.24 billion (approximately 
US dollar 3.94 billion as per the June 2013 exchange rate) (Differding 
Consulting 2013). Widely advertised and distributed, aggressively mar-
keted over a short span of time, hybrid seeds are fast displacing their 
open pollinated counterparts for some crops. For example, despite 
repeated crop failure of the Bt crop in Vidarbha32, seed dealers admit-
ted that there was hardly any non-Bt hybrid variety available in the 
market by 2007. One dealer said, "we get good margins on Bt from 
the companies. Also, the companies haven’t marketed [other seed 
varieties] this time around."33  
The reasons for the agricultural biotechnology industry’s hybrid-
boom are quite obvious. First, they provide inherent trade secret type 
   
 


























protection against competitors because their parental lines are not 
required to be disclosed and difficult to identify by any process similar 
to reverse engineering in pharmaceuticals (Kochupillai 2011: 92). 
Secondly, hybrid seeds are "programmed" to not replicate true to their 
type and vigour. As a result, new seeds must be purchased every plan-
ting season, ensuring that technology weakens the seed rights of the 
farmers. High technology has a capacity to not only displace land races 
and farmers’ seed varieties through projections of expertise, risk 
management, enhanced productivity, but also to supersede those pro-
perty rights attached to traditional open pollinated seeds. The "coup-
ling" of narratives of innovation with that of property renders conven-
tional ownership norms benign and less significant than before, a point 
I further reiterate in the next section. 
Claiming Innovation 
In order to claim innovation benefits and intellectual property protec-
tion, a farmer is required to register her crop with the Plant Variety 
Authority. This ensures that the variety and its specificities and genea-
logy are recorded and authorial claims are established. However, what 
is interesting are the conditions mandated for registration. The PPV&FR 
Act grants plant variety protection for four plant varieties—'new varie-
ties, farmers’ varieties, extant varieties, and essentially derived varie-
ties'. All four types can be registered reflecting the interests of various 
breeders and their authorial identity. The explicit inclusion of farmers’ 
varieties is an endorsement of the proprietorial and authorial status of 
the farmer which, as we saw in the preceding section, had been esta-
blished through his right to save, re-sow, exchange, and sell. However, 
at the same time it is clear that farmer rights are co-equal rights and 
their varieties do not receive the benefit of any differential treatment 
within the scope of the Act, ignoring differences in the socio-economic 
location of the farmer and the colossal variations in breeding practices 
and technologies mobilised.  
Adopting UPOV style protection, the Act prescribes DUS standards—
distinctiveness, uniformity and stability—for all varieties (including 
extant and farmers) in order to be eligible for registration and pro-
tection.34 This is the first step where the protection of farmer’s variety 
and, through it, the protection of farmers’ rights, is likely to run into 
problems. Farmers’ varieties are generally niche-specific and dispersed 
through an informal system of seed exchange. Through a process of 
repeated propagation, progeny assessment and advancement the 
   
 


























farmer’s variety tends to be relatively homogenous (intra-specie) with 
unique identities (inter-species) and with a history of being governed 
by market driven selections. But the important question here is how 
demonstrable are these features under the norms prescribed by the 
Act? The level of distinctiveness, between one farmer variety and ano-
ther, required for registration of the variety, may not be either demon-
strable or identifiable.  
When a farmer selects seeds over generation, s/he is driven by con-
siderations other than those that govern proprietorial and innovation 
claims. DUS has never been a driving factor for farmers who have 
instead based their selection on yield, stability, risk avoidance, low 
dependence on external inputs and attributes related to storage, 
cooking and taste (Green Foundation, 2003). In addition to environ-
mental and biological factors, Saxena and Singh (2006) argue that 
social, cultural and economic reasons contribute in precise selection of 
variability and its propagation. They state that "[m]ost cultivars have 
been selected and cultivated because they meet human requirements 
and please the farmer." (2006: 1451) 
Nagarajan et. al. (2008: 211) bring to attention yet another reason 
why farmers’ variety may not exhibit DUS standards. They argue that 
farmers wilfully retain a certain degree of heterogeneity to cushion 
against environmental aberrations and sustain consumer preferences. 
So a farmer’s criterion is stability of performance between varying 
years. Contrast this with plant breeders who conduct mass selection to 
breed varieties to excel in performance, bypassing the trials and selec-
tions that a farmer does over years before s/he achieves a respectable 
yield, fit to be distributed horizontally over a niche geographical and 
agronomic location. This means that it is entirely possible that the 
special features that plant varieties have are matters of observable 
preference, and that farmers may not have varieties with spectacular 
morphological variations (Nagarajan et al. 2008; Saxena & Singh 
2006; Kochupillai 2011).  
While commercial breeders may be successful in getting their varie-
ties protected under the Act, farmers may not be able to do so 
because of the built-in antiquity and their inability to meet the criteria 
of distinctness, uniformity and stability, borrowed uncritically from the 
UPOV Convention for the registration of breeders’ varieties. Srinivasan 
(2003) argues that IPR-based farmers' rights approaches are unlikely 
to provide significant economic returns to farmers or farming commu-
nities. 
   
 


























Establishing the distinctiveness of farmers’ variety can be a challen-
ging enterprise for a farmer given his financial capacities and his socio-
economic capabilities. It is interesting to note that even though far-
mers’ varieties have recorded the highest number of applications 
(largely due to a spurt between March 2012-March 2014), they regis-
ter the lowest rate of conversions in the number of certificates gran-
ted. Before it jumped to 7.55 percent in March 2014, till September 
2012, the percentage share of total certificates of registrations granted 
was only 1.23 percent (Manjunatha et al. 2013: 2). More revealing is 
the fact that almost all farmers’ variety registrations have been for rice 
(and, two for wheat), which is a self-pollinating crop and has a low 
seed replacement rate. In contrast, new varieties registered have been 
for hybrid varieties of maize, sorghum, pearl millet and most for tetra-
ploid cotton, which have a negligible seed replacement rate and which 
therefore compels a farmer to source these seeds from the market. 88 
percent of the new varieties have been registered by private sector 
companies that include transnational corporations like Monsanto, 
Bayer, Syngenta and Pioneer.35  
It is clear that the PPV&FR Act adopts the DUS criterion but does not 
find it necessary to scientifically validate levels of non-uniformity tole-
rated and preferred by both farmers and consumers. The standards of 
innovation, and legal claims of property that relate to innovation co-
produce a space that simultaneously sustains two kinds of narratives: 
one, of biotechnology as scientific and universally and legally appropri-
ate; and two, of traditional knowledge (embedded in farmers’ varieties 
and rights) as a legal claim, if scientifically appropriate. This is the tau-
tological, almost perverse irony of entitling poor marginalised farmers. 
In reflecting on the content of farmers’ rights within the larger 
assemblage of IPR, I have so far tried to demonstrate how the innova-
tion discourse supports only particular property claims and how it 
renders others, like farmers’ claims over their varieties, notional 
(Nagarajan et al. 2008). In the next section I examine issues of access 
to rights. While rights are instruments that provide access to resources 
and liberties, access to rights is a matter that is relatively under-reflec-
ted. What kind of access law provides is an important question, but an 
equally important question is, what kind of access there is to law in 
general? I want to shift the focus from the content of rights to ques-
tions of access and argue that a focus on the capacious content of the 
FRs only serves to divert attention away from how access to the con-
tent is disabled at various levels in the practical play of this right. 
   
 



























As mentioned earlier, the PPV&FR Act allows for registration of four 
varieties—new, farmers’, extant and essentially derived varieties These 
four varieties and the rights corresponding to them have multiple 
stakeholders: breeders, farmers, community, public sector or NGOs. 
Often, there can be multiple claimants for one variety. Breeding of a 
crop variety would typically require use of another protected variety 
and could, therefore, entail considerable bargaining and negotiations 
for commercialisation. It could pose problems of overlapping claims 
and result in complicated bargaining requirements for utilisation of 
varieties, and/or with weak correlatives of duties and obligations.36  
In a study conducted on farmers and the impact of the PPV&FR Act, 
Anitha Ramanna points out that the farmers who were interviewed said 
that they were not aware of "farmers’ rights" (Ramanna 2006: 27). 
Several respondents in her study pointed out the legal and practical 
difficulties, experienced by farmers in fulfilling the DUS criteria for 
registering varieties under India’s PPV&FR Act (ibid.: 37). Even the 
benefit-sharing entitlements presume a legal capacity on part of the 
farmer. First, a farmer has to be aware that an application for a plant 
breeders’ right has been made. S/he has no means of obtaining this 
information except by obtaining access to the gazette where the pub-
lication has been made. The farmer then needs to have an adequate 
measure of literacy and legal literacy to understand the meaning of the 
publication in order to make a benefit sharing application. 
Annual reports of the Plant Variety Authority, published in the Plant 
Variety Journal reveal that even though claims for benefit-sharing are 
invited routinely—by publishing details of varieties for which regis-
tration certificates have been issued in the Plant Variety Journal (49 
CoR in 2010; 117 in 2011; 212 in 2012; 304 in 2013; 833 in 2014; 
266 in 2015 till 1 Dec. 2015)37—there have been no claims for sharing 
benefits by the farmers. First, his/her location impedes such claims; 
second, parental lines of new hybrid varieties are difficult to identify, 
making the very idea of benefit-sharing notional (Nagarajan et al. 
2008). 
There is a requirement, as Steiner proposes, "that the various corre-
lative duties entailed by any such set of rights must all be jointly per-
formable [or jointly redressable in case duties have been breached] 
and none can be mutually obstructive" (2009: 1–2).  This implies that 
the duties must entail a set of obligations, or forbearance, that trans-
late into mutually differentiable claims. If rights lack requisite mutual 
   
 


























differentiability, then the correlative duties may not be controllable by 
(any or all) rights’ bearers i.e. holders of rights may not be vested with 
the powers to waive and, alternatively, demand/enforce compliance 
with that claim’s correlative duty.38 Such rights then do not standardly 
conform to a genre of property rights.  
Farmers’ rights in India, by libertarian standards, can be said to fall 
in the category of a "non-property property right." They may display 
the rhetoric and semantic facade of property rights, but they belie their 
poorer bearers through a content that is cunning and "overlapping" 
with breeders’ claims. The standard analytical approach of evaluating a 
right in terms of its content, then evaluating it as "weak" or "strong" 
will need to abandoned here. "Content" is a necessary condition for 
rights’ realisation, but, as this Indian case demonstrates, not its suf-
ficient condition. Content wise these rights are "strong", with all the 
sticks of the property bundle—save, sell, exchange, sell—but the 
"cunning" lies in rendering these as insufficient for organising the 
material stakes of the farmers. 
Farmers’ rights in India point to a distinct way of thinking about the 
content of law. A focus on the content of rights needs to be supple-
mented with an attention to the conditions under which lawful relations 
are organised, rights-claims accrue, get denied, thrive, or wither. In 
other words, attention to the content of rights forms only one part of 
the rights story: access to rights forms the other, equally important 
aspect of rights protocols. While the access that rights provide is an 
important question, the access to the right itself is a question that 
deserves more attention. Benefiting from rights depends not only on 
the availability of legal rights that are enforceable, but also on the abi-
lity of traditional communities to use law as a recourse and resource 
(Dutfield 2006). Incapacity to bear costs, inability to understand the 
terms of legality and technology, in short, failure to inhabit a cognitive 
system that is alien, makes a farmer’s claim to his co-equal right deep-
ly constrained. Chandrashekaran and Vasudev (2002) raise an impor-
tant question: Do all farmers or breeders deserve equal protection? 
They argue that protection under the PPV&FR Act is deemed to be pro-
portional to the contribution a farmer makes in conservation of land 
races and developing "farmers’ varieties" and that such a strategy is 
bound to be dysfunctional because it ignores the fact of the Indian 
peasantry who are "numerically enormous, less literate and less 
resourceful than other sections of society" (Chandrashekaran & 
Vasudev 2002: 513). 
   
 



























There can be two readings of the PPV&FR Act. The first reading focuses 
on the conceptual strides made by the PPV&FR Act that culled out a 
semantic and material space inside of which farmers can potentially 
assert their claims. This reading regards the legislation as important 
for a variety of reasons. Firstly, "the importance of sui generis legisla-
tion pushes the idea of intellectual property beyond the idea of patents 
and breeders’ rights and beyond the specific commitments that coun-
tries take under TRIPS agreement" (Cullet 2005: 245–6, emphasis in 
original?). It affirms the legal veracity of knowledge and farming sys-
tems that have come to acquire a "prio-art" and "folk" status. It lega-
lises the authorial status of farmers as breeders (Rangnekar 2013) by 
regarding a breeder as "any person or group of persons or a farmer or 
group of farmers or any institution which has bred, evolved or deve-
loped any variety […]" (PPV&FRA, Section 41 (1)). 
By including farmers within the conceptual category of the "bree-
der", the legislation shifts the framings of farmers’ contributions 
beyond the stewardship and conservation narrative (Sahai 1994; Shiva 
1996), thereby bridging the conceptual and the entitlement gap 
between the breeder and the farmer. By making farmers, and their 
production of knowledge, subjects and objects of protection, the legis-
lation provides a counter to the idea of innovation being location—and 
episteme—specific. The legal and authorial affirmation of farmers’ 
rights becomes an important corrective to international law regimes 
that exclude them from formal and informal routines of plant variety 
protection law.  
The second reading—to which I have attempted to draw attention 
to—sees this Act as combining three discursive modalities—that of ste-
wardship (right to rewards and benefit sharing), ownership (right to 
save, sell, re-use, exchange) and innovation (right to register seeds 
that meet the DUS standards). How can we read this capacious, if 
complicated, articulation of an ethico-political gesture which is simulta-
neously wrapped in the vocabulary of stewardship, culture, history, 
and of property, innovation, efficiency? Is there a "double movement" 
here whereby, drawing from Lefort (1988: 11), the content and intent 
of these rights simultaneously appear and are obscured? What 
"appears", or is made apparent through the formal language of the 
law, are famers’ rights that appear to incorporate generational, owner-
ship and innovation claims. But what is obscured is the locus of poli-
tics, the locus in which parties compete and in which certain kinds of 
agency are reproduced and certain kinds subverted, as well as the 
   
 


























general principles, or the "serving criterion" that govern the overall 
configuration. 
The key to understanding the locus of politics, to draw from the 
analytical frame developed by Goodman, Sorj and Wilkinson (1987), 
lies in the twin processes of "appropriationism" and "substitutionism". 
While appropriationism seeks to advance capital accumulation through 
a replacement of all aspects of agricultural production, substitutionism 
seeks to replace agricultural end products, reducing them to industrial 
inputs for manufactured products. Substitutionism seeks to "interpose 
mechanised industrial processing and manufacture between the source 
of field production and final consumption" (Goodman et al. 1987: 60). 
The former signals the coalescing of pre-existing biophysical processes 
of production with new processes derived from industrial, scientific and 
business domains, substituting old (agricultural) products with new 
(industrial) products. Together they result in a discontinuous but 
persistent undermining of indigenous elements of the agricultural pro-
duction process and end products, reducing both the process and the 
products into commoditised inputs for manufactured products (ibid.: 
2). It entails, to borrow a pithy phrase from Kloppenburg, the "produc-
tion of commodities by commodities" (1988: 2-3).  
Biotechnological industries alter the chain linking farm product and 
final consumption, transforming the anatomy of agricultural produc-
tivity, almost bringing to an end, as Goodman et al. state, "the prehis-
tory of food industry and farming" (1987: 189). Through an incurpo-
ration of agriculture within the broader dynamics of the industrial sys-
tem, the analytical separation between agriculture and industry (that 
had initially prevented a complete subsumption of agriculture under 
capitalism) is broken down, making them two contiguous, constitutive 
domains (ibid.: 183–9).  
While the physical aspects of biotechnologies raise issues of appro-
priationism and substitutionism, the proprietary aspects of biotechno-
logy are multifaceted and complex. Full commodification of the 
seed/plant variety requires that seed be first appropriated technologi-
cally, through genetic engineering and modification, and then substitu-
ted by their genetically engineered counterparts, transfiguring as a 
result, not just the epistemic spaces of farmers’ seed know-how, but 
also transforming their ontological life-world. 
To the twin categories proposed by Goodman et. al., Pechlaner adds 
a third—"expropriationism" to suggest that a network of legal rights 
and obligations accompany technologies of production, and that legal 
   
 


























and technological means together often subsume traditional forms of 
wealth generation and ownership strategies in spaces of every such 
encounter (Pechlaner 2014: 25-7). Technological interventions, toge-
ther with legal paraphernalia of multiple, imbricated property rights 
reconstitute the realm of ownership, where in the absence of techno-
scientific innovation, "old" forms of ownership are rendered ineffective 
as protective or remunerative mechanisms.  
The sui generis claims of farming communities seek to incorporate 
and institutionalise what are increasingly seen as cultural claims. The 
global shift towards human rights rhetoric in the post decolonisation 
era has meant that some conception of farmers’ rights, indigenous 
entitlements, have come to be incorporated in legal frames, albeit with 
varying ambitions and jurisdictions. However, the positivisation and 
globalisation of these rights has also meant that these rights do not 
find an easy fit in the text of the law. Assigning communities rights, 
assigning distinct farming cultures jurisdiction, imposes a contrarian 
burden on the IPR assemblage. It has meant that the legalised expres-
sions of indigenous farming entitlements will only entail a set of obli-
gations that do not really destabilise the economic interests of IPR hol-
ders. It is here that we encounter the conceptual as well as political 
limits of farmers’ rights.  
Farmers’ rights, as a species of legal pluralism, speaks in the name 
of indigeneity and culture, but its primary allegiance remains the inter-
ests of the innovators, admitting a built-in dysfunction that does not 
take into account the future trajectory of rights’ activity, competition, 
and conflicts. Elizabeth Povinelli (2002: 12) calls the malleability and 
acquiescence of cultural rights as the "invisible asterisk" of the human 
rights-to-culture approach. She writes, "an invisible asterisk, a proviso, 
hovers above every enunciation of indigenous customary law: '(pro-
vided [they] are not so repugnant)'" (2002: 176). Legal pluralism, in 
the form of farmers’ rights, is admitted as a compromise between two 
competing value systems of diverse biocultures, and as minimum stan-
dards of toleration required to direct traffic in new biotic resources and 
identities that are forged in relation to law.  
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1 A version of this paper was published as a chapter titled "Rights" in my book 2016. The cunning 
of rights: law, life, biocultures. Delhi: OUP.  
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protected varieties, similar to the intellectual property protection offered via copyright on books 
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FAO Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture is as follows: "Right over plant 
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choose, store and freely exchange genetic resources." 1996 Intervention to the FAO/CGRFA by 
Via Campensina,  
http://www.ukabc.org/Via_Camp.html [retrieved 02.10.2016]. 
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movements in their struggles for community-controlled and biodiversity-based food systems. 
http://www.grain.org/pages/organisation [retrieved on 02.03.2016]. 
7 The core objective of ITPGRFA is the conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic 
resources for food and agriculture and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of 
their use. In particular, ITPGRFA requires protection of farmers’ rights to traditional knowledge 
and to equitable benefits from the use of genetic resources. It also recognizes the enormous 
contribution that indigenous communities, local communities, and farmers have made to the 
conservation and development of crop genetic resources.  
http://www.fao.org/plant-treaty/en/ [retrieved 24.10.2014]. 
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10 See further the Preamble to the CBD,  
https://www.cbd.int/convention/articles/default.shtml?a=cbd-00 [retrieved 04.10.16]. 
11 An outcome of the UNEP expert group on biological diversity, the CBD’s main aim has been the 
promotion of sustainable agriculture and the maintenance of biological diversity. 
https://www.cbd.int/intro/default.shtml [retrieved 11.11.2016]. 
12 Rangnekar, D. 2014. The cunning state of farmers’ rights in India: aligning with global law or 
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objective of the Convention is the protection of new varieties of plants by an intellectual 
property right called 'breeders' rights’. It is an instrument that privileges and protects innovation 
claims of the breeders and reduces farmers’ generational claims as 'privileges'. Each successive 
amendment has curtailed 'farmer’s privilege' to reuse propagating material from the previous 
year’s harvest and to freely exchange seeds. A sui generis conceptualisation, in contrast, has 
stronger articulations of farmers’ rights and aims to protect the generational claims of farmers 
even as it develops a system of plant variety protection. 
14 See UPOV, publication no. 437 (EN)—India is included among the States and intergovernmental 
organisations which have initiated the procedure for joining UPOV,  
http://www.upov.int/export/sites/upov/about/en/pdf/pub437.pdf [retrieved 04.10.16]. 
15 Navdanya. n.d. Bija Satyagraha,  
http://navdanya.org/campaigns/bija-satyagriha [retrieved 02.08.16]. 
16 See interview of KRRS members in Ashlesha Khadse & Niloshree Bhattacharya. 2013. India: a 
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http://caravan.squat.net/ICC-en/Krrs-en/Monquitin-en.htm [retrieved 02.08.16]. 
18 M.D. Najundaswami. 1998. Cremating Monsanto: genetically modified fields on fire. 
http://artactivism.members.gn.apc.org/allpdfs/152-Cremating%20Monsanto.pdf [retrieved, 
07.11.16]. 
19 Interesting facet of mutation of citizenship is that farmers were not represented at this forum  
despite their citizen status and Monsanto was invited by the JPC to make an oral submission 
during its public consultations on the Bill in 2000. It was the only individual company which did 
so Government of India, Joint Parliamentary Committee. 2000.  
20 Lok Sabha Secretariat. 2000. Joint committee on the protection of plant varieties and farmer’s  
rights bill, 1999. Report of the Joint Committee presented in the Lok Sabha on 25 August, 2000, 
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21 Preamble to the PPV&FR Act, 2001. 
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23 The PPV&FR Act, Section 39 (1) (iv). 
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26 Ibid., Section 39 (2); Section 41 (3). 
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28 See, GM Watch. n.d. Monsanto-Mahyco pursued over farmer compensation,  
http://www.gmwatch.org/latest-listing/45-2006/67-monsanto-mahyco-pursued-over-farmer-
compensation [retrieved 02.08.14).  
In another example, the Sindewahi Rice Station (a part of Dr. Punjabrao Deshmukh Krishi 
Vidyapith University, Maharashtra (herein after, the University) took five kilos of the HMT seeds 
from a farmer, Khobragade, to conduct "experiments" on it. Four years later, the University 
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2011). In all three cases, these individual farmers were sued by Monsanto for saving and re-using 
patented seeds in their own fields.  
30 Monsanto distributes the patented seeds by authorizing various companies to produce the 
seeds and sell them to farmers. It required those seed companies to obtain a signed Technology 
Agreement from purchasers. For details see Chandra 2010: 256-9. 
31 Most plant varieties today are protected by various legislations on PVP. This means that a 
particular variety may only be sold as a class of certified seed. Seeds of the same variety, which 
are not certified, are called brown bag seeds and the process is called brown bagging, which is 
legal in some countries like India and is illegal in some countries like the US. 
32 See, Coalition for GM-Free India. n.d. 10 years of Bt Cotton: false hype and failed promises 
cotton farmers’ crisis continues with crop failure and suicides,  
www.biosafety-info.net/file_dir/551137394f82a8adac3ad.pdf  [Retrieved 02.08.2014].  
Bt (bacillus thuringiensis) is a naturally occurring plant bacterium that is inserted into the genetic 
composition of cotton to make it resistant to bollworm infestation, considered to be one of the 
major destroyers of cotton crop. 
33 Hardikar, Jaideep. 2007. Bt-ing the farmers. India Together. 2 July, 2007. Available at 
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Hindu. Global Research, 7. Apr.  2007.  
34 For UPOV guidance on DUD standards see Union for Protection of Plant Varieties, 2011. DUS 
Guidance., 
http://www.upov.int/resource/en/dus_guidance.html  [retrieved 12.11.2016]. 
35 One of the problems with agricultural biotechnology, writes Chandrashekaran, is that it’s 
methods and products are increasingly being patented and licensed to the private sector. Patent 
rights, breeders’ rights in each incremental improvement in a crop means "successive layers of  
IPR 'accumulate' such that the germ is 'highly IP encumbered'." Chandrsekaran, B. et al. 2010. A 
textbook of agronomy. New Age International Publishers, p. 513. 
36 See for instance Mrinalini Kochupillai’s detailed investigation of the numerous issues that 
confront the protection of parental lines of extant hybrids in India and the manner in which they 
played out in the Order of the Registrar of Plant Varieties dated 25 May, 2012 in the matter of 
Maharashtra Hybrid Seed Co. and Ors. (The Parental Lines Case). The key issue was whether 
Parental Lines of Extant Hybrid Plant Varieties should be protected under the category of Extant 
or New Varieties under the Indian Protection of Plant Varieties & Farmers’ Rights Act, 2001 
(PPV&FR Act). Reddy, Prashant. 2012. Protecting Parental Lines of Extant Hybrids in India, SpicyIP. 
http://spicyip.com/2012/09/guest-post-part-i-protecting-parental.html [25.08.-2014].  
                                                                                                                                                                  
   
 


























For further details of the case, see Prasar, Vigyan. n.d. Diffusing prosperity despite remaining 
poor: case of HMT Plant Variety, 
http://www.vigyanprasar.gov.in/Radioserials/Radio_Serial_Grass_Root_Innovations/Episode_7_
1.pdf  [retrieved 28.08.14].  
See also Khobragade, Dadaji. n.d. The creator of HMT Rice: a school dropout beats trained 
agriculturists,  
www.ftfoundation.com/English/pdf/DadajiKhobragade.pdf [retrieved 02.09.2015]. 
37 Compiled from Annual Reports of Plant Variety journal of corresponding years. No published  
data for 2010-2013, for years preceding 2010 see, Chandra 2016: 173. 
38 This is a necessary and sufficient condition of a Hohfeldian claim right. 
Bibliography 
Anderson, Regine. 2005. The history of farmers’ rights: a guide to cen-
tral documents and literature. FNI report, 8/2005. Lysaker: The 
Fridtjof Nansen Institute. 
Borowiak, C. 2004. Farmers’ rights: intellectual property regimes and 
the struggle over seeds. Politics and Society, 32 (4), pp. 511-43. 
Brahmi, P., S. Saxena & B.S. Dhillon. 2004. Protection of plant varie-
ties and Farmer’s Rights Act of India. Current Science, 86 (3), pp. 
392–8. 
Chandra, Rajshree. 2016. The cunning of rights: law, life, biocultures. 
New Delhi: OUP. 
_____. 2010. Knowledge as property: issues in the moral grounding of 
intellectual property rights. New Delhi: OUP. 
Chandrashekaran, S. & S. Vasudev. 2002. The Indian Plant Variety 
Protection Act beneficiaries: the Indian farmer or the corporate 
seed company? Journal of Intellectual Property Rights, 7, pp. 
506–15. 
Chaturvedi, Sachin. 2002. Agricultural biotechnology and new trends in 
IPR Regime: challenges before developing countries. Economic 
and Political Weekly, 37 (13), pp. 1212–22. 
Cullet, Philippe. 2005. Intellectual property protection and sustainable 
development. New Delhi: Butterworths Publishing.  
Fowler, Cary. 1994. Unnatural selection: technology, politics and plant 
evolution: international studies in global change. Switzerland: 
Gordon and Breach. 
Goodman, David & Michael Redclift. 1991. Refashioning nature: food, 
ecology and culture. New York: Routledge. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
   
 


























Goodman, D., B. Sorj & J. Wilkinson. 1987. From farming to biotech-
nology. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Hohfeld, Wesley. 1917. Fundamental legal conceptions as applied in 
judicial reasoning’. Yale Law School: Faculty Scholarship Series, 
Paper 4378, pp. 710-70.  
India seed industry outlook to FY’2018: rapid hybridization in vege-
tables, corn and rice to impel growth. Ken Research Report, April 
2013. Gurgaon: Ken Research. 
Kloppenburg, Jack. 1988. First the seed: the political economy of plant 
biotechnology 1492–2000. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Klemm, Susette Biber et al. 2006. The current law of plant genetic 
resources and traditional knowledge’. In: Susette Biber Klemm & 
Thomas Cottier, eds. Rights to plant genetic resources and traditi-
onal knowledge. Wallingford: Cabi Publishing, pp. 56-111. 
Kochupillai, M. 2011. India’s plant variety protection law: historical and 
implementation perspectives. Journal of Intellectual Property 
Rights, 16 (2), pp. 88–101. 
Lefort, C. 1988. Democracy and political theory. Oxford: Polity Press. 
Manjunatha, B. L. et al. 2013. The legal protection of public and pri-
vate plant varieties in India: a comparative analysis. Journal of 
Bioremediation & Biodegradation, 4 (7), pp. 1-5. 
Nagarajan, S. et. al. 2008. Farmers’ variety in the context of plant 
variety protection and Farmers’ Rights Act, 2001. Current 
Science, 94 (6), pp. 709-13. 
Ramanna, Anitha. 2006. Farmers’ rights in India: a case study. FNI 
Report, 6/2006. Lysaker: The Fridtjof Nansen Institute. 
Rangnekar, Dwijen. 2013. The cunning state of farmers’ rights in 
India: aligning with global law or emancipating farmers?. Paper 
presented at the conference Food sovereignty: a critical dialogue, 
Conference paper 73, program in agrarian studies, Yale 
University, Place, 14-15 September 2013. 
Rao, Niranjan C. 2004. Indian seed system and plant variety protec-
tion. Economic and Political Weekly, 39 (8), pp. 845-52. 
Sainath, P. 2007. Farm suicides in India, the result of profit driven 
"free market" Reforms. The Hindu, 7 Apr.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
   
 


























Saxena, S. & A. Singh. 2006. Revisit to definitions and the inventtori-
zation or registration of landrace, folk, farmers’ and traditional 
varieties. Current Science, 11, pp. 1451-4.  
Seshia, S. 2002. Plant variety protection and farmers’ rights: law-
making and cultivation of varietal control. Economic and Political 
Weekly, 37 (27), pp. 2741-7. 
Shiva, Vandana. 1996. Agricultural biodiversity, intellectual property 
rights and farmers’ rights. Economic and Political Weekly, 31 
(25), pp. 1621–31. 
Srinivasan, C. S. 2003. Exploring the feasibility of farmers’ rights. 
Development Policy Review, 21 (4), pp. 419-47.  
Steiner, Hillel. 2009. Left libertarianism and the ownership of natural 
resources. Public Reason, 1 (1), pp. 1-8. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
